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PRIVATIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
NEIL K. KOMESAR*
Professor Ronald Cass has presented us with a paper which has many
levels and aspects. He has provided us with a taxonomy of privatization; a
descripton of potential legal constraints on privatization and a theory of
government which he associates with privatization. Several features of Pro-
fessor Cass' paper are impressive as well as enlightening. However, I am
left uncomfortable with his basic analytical framework which seems inade-
quate for the tasks Professor Cass wishes to assign it. In the comments
which follow, I suggest how that framework might be altered to allow it to
meet these intellectual challenges.
The taxonomy of privatization presented in the first part of Professor
Cass' paper seems a particularly valuable contribution to the existing litera-
ture. As Professor Cass notes, privatization covers a vast variety of actions
and proposals. The very notion of privatization is illusive. It is a subject as
broad as the study of societal decisionmaking itself. Privatization involves
the allocation of societal decisionmaking from one set of decisionmakers
(the public sector - legislatures and administrative agencies) to another set
(the private sector - the market). This allocation, whether from public to
private or the reverse, has always been a subject of controversy and impor-
tance. Professor Cass offers a sophisticated apparatus for integrating and
cataloging the dimensions and categories of the recent privatization
controversy.
Professor Cass also offers us an encyclopedic view of the potential
sources of legal constraints or problems. Though this discussion seems
thorough, the analysis seems a bit wooden. Professor Cass concludes that
there are few, if any, "legal" constraints on government decisions to priva-
tize. On one level, his conclusion seems unassailable. To the extent that
"legal" constraints are judicial constraints, a source of some ambiguity in
Professor Cass' discussion, there are few legal constraints on governmental
regulatory decisions in general. Outside of the use of such categories as
race, alienage and gender or regulation of first amendment activities, there
are few substantive constitutional constraints. Even procedural due process
does not provide many problems for governmental choice here. Issues of
federalism and separation of powers have little bite, notwithstanding the
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courts' occasional concern about the structure of congressional decision-
making or state regulations which inhibit interstate commerce.
Given the limited scope of constitutional constraints in general, it is not
surprising that there are few constitutional constraints on privatization in
particular. However, we know that the courts will occasionally invalidate
governmental action under such doctrines as takings, delegation and struc-
tural due process, as well as equal protection and even substantive due pro-
cess. Before we too easily assume that privatization will pass unscathed
through the constitutional thicket, it is advisable to know the factors which
have caused constitutional problems elsewhere. The delegation doctrine,
the notion of entitlements and the definition of state action are malleable.
Although their use has varied over time, they are clearly available to courts
who wish to use them. The salient issue here is not whether they could be
employed, but whether they will be employed.
Similarly, the power of courts to interpret statutes allows the courts to
place constraints on both federal and state legislation as well as administra-
tive action. We have a complex public sector with interactions between
levels and branches of government and a vast web of administrative agen-
cies. Courts bent on mischief could find the means to limit government
action on privatization through their interpretation of the ever-present am-
biguities in regulatory or deregulatory schemes. Again, the issue is not
whether the courts could constrain or defeat privatization through statu-
tory interpretation, but whether they would decide to do so.
Here, Professor Cass' discussion seems too much a report of what can
be seen, as opposed to an attempt to project what the reaction might be.
Privatization, although very old, has only recently caught the attention of
public officials, judges and scholars. The picture of government action and
behavior which unfolds may determine whether judicial discretion activates
dormant doctrines and manipulates statutory ambiguities and conflicts.
We need a way to analyze this potential reaction. I have previously
suggested that such analysis might be undertaken by focusing on the actual
or perceived relative merits of alternative decisionmakers.' In the setting
just discussed, the question of the degree and form of judicial response
might be analyzed by examining the attributes of legislative versus judicial
decisionmaking in the area of privatization in general or for each of the
1. Komesar, A Job for the Judges-The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Com-
plex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. - (1988) [hereinafter A Job for the Judges]; Komesar, Back to the
Future-An Institutional View of Making and Interpreting Constitutions, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 191
(1987); Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional
Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981); Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction
to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984).
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various forms of privatization. Professor Cass seems to leave this institu-
tional comparison largely unexplored.
To his credit, Professor Cass does focus on institutions or at least one
set of institutions elsewhere in his paper. In Section IV, he argues that we
need to have a "theory of government."2 Such an assertion seems unassail-
able since it is the supposed failures of government which justify privatiza-
tion and, paradoxically, the same government process which must decide
whether, when and in what form, to privatize. Professor Cass' analysis in
this connection, although intellectually impressive, is troubling at several
levels. First, the theory of government he proposes is basically incomplete.
Second, even a complete theory of government is insufficient as a means of
analyzing privatization without parallel conceptions of relevant alternative
institutions - the market and the judiciary are prominent examples - and
a means of comparing these institutions.
Professor Cass argues that there are two competing models of govern-
mental choice - the public interest model and the public choice model.
The latter he associates with what might be called a special interest (or
what I have called a minoritarian bias) model.3 Under the public choice
model, small, concentrated interests parlay their advantages in organization
into political influence (and rent-seeking) to the disadvantage of the dis-
persed majority. The public interest model, in contrast, has no sophisti-
cated theory of behavior. It largely assumes that government officials do
good. Although Professor Cass acknowledges the weak analytical under-
pinnings of the public interest model, he argues that it must be working
sometimes because the public choice (special interest) model does not ex-
plain instances in which dispersed majorities succeed over concentrated mi-
norities, or instances which seem consistent with the public interest.
Therefore, he concludes, there is a need to turn to a mixed [public interest/
public choice] model where "political competition" is imperfect and polit-
ical figures are seen as capturing rents themselves often in the form of their
preference for public interest activities. From this analytical base he makes
a leap to the conclusion that government will minimize cost and sometimes
achieve the public good.
I find the analysis and the associated conclusions uncompelling. The
analytical model which connects imperfections in political competition, and
captured by governmental actors, with the achievement of the public inter-
est is weak. Even if we assume that political competition is imperfect, Pro-
2. See Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 449, 497-522 (1988)
[hereinafter Cass].
3. Id. at 475-77.
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fessor Cass' model provides no conception of when or why it would be
imperfect - that is, when or why there would be deviation from the control
of political constraints. We also do not know when or why political officials
would extract their rents in the form of public interest activity. In addition,
we do not know when or why the public interest conception of a large
number of public officials will coincide. Quite a few public figures must,
one, be loosened from the constraints of political competition; two, wish to
extract rents in the form of public interest; and three, have the same con-
ception of the public interest simultaneously, before Professor Cass' model
would produce any systematic results, let alone the results he supposes.
Such a possibility may exist, but I would not want to build a positive theory
of government on it.
Professor Cass is correct in saying that the special interest model, which
informs the economic theory of regulation, does not explain governmental
action where dispersed majorities win or where governmental action is effi-
cient. However, I disagree with his conclusion that the already dubious
public interest model is the only alternative available. I have argued else-
where that the special interest model of political behavior is not the only
available perception of government response to the rarified public interest
model.4
In a governmental structure where majority voting plays a role, one can-
not dismiss a distortion which operates in a direction opposite from the
special interest model. The special interest model assumes that a concen-
trated minority with advantages in organization and information-gathering
will prevail over a dispersed majority whose low per capita impact may not
even justify the resource outlays to recognize their position. For example,
consumer legislation, supposedly promoted for the consumers' benefit, may
often harm those who it is supposedly meant to help because special interest
groups are able to obtain rents by impeding competition through such legis-
lation. Consumers and taxpayers are easy pickings for rent seekers because
of the economics of organization and information; the per capita impact of
a given law on a given consumer or taxpayer is so small that there is no
incentive to expend the resources in understanding the law's impact, let
alone organizing to fight it.
But there is also a traditional perception which sees a dispersed, low per
capita impact majority with advantages over a minority with high per cap-
ita impact. Phrases like "tyranny of the majority" reflect this perception.
Most constitutional law of the last fifty years reveals a greater sensitivity to
this form of bias than to special interest bias. Here it is the advantage of
4. See A Job for the Judges, supra note 1.
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numbers - unweighted voting - which causes the distortion. To empha-
size the parallel and contrasting natures of these conceptions of public deci-
sionmaking, I have come to call these polar visions of governmental
malfunction majoritarian and minoritarian biases, rather than "tyranny of
the majority" and special interests theories.5
I am not about to argue, nor do I believe, that majoritarian bias, rather
than minoritarian bias, characterizes governmental choice in general, or
government privatization choices in particular. It is my view that both
models are useful in understanding government decisionmaking. Whether
one or the other is more likely in a given setting depends on a range of
factors relating to the costs of information and organization and the degrees
of concentration and dispersion of interests. Relevant to the present in-
quiry, I see no reason to assume that the vast range of decisions we call
privatization, which involve a broad range of governmental decisionmaking
institutions and governmental activity, will necessarily be characterized by
one rather than the other of these biases.
We can now envision any observed successes of dispersed majorities
over concentrated minorities as the products of a public choice analysis
rather than as exceptions to it. In a given setting, the forces of the two
biases may also tend to cancel each other out, producing a seemingly effi-
cient result in the aggregate, while still consistent with rent-seeking behav-
ior by individuals. This analysis would explain nonrent-seeking results
without recourse to a public interest model which envisions political figures
consciously seeking the public interest. The existence of polar biases also
makes the determination of corrective mechanisms more difficult. What
corrects minoritarian bias can aggravate majoritarian bias and vice versa.
This Comment is not the place to work through these implications; I have
done so elsewhere.6 My point is that a theory of government used to ad-
dress privatization should include the possibility of majoritarian as well as
minoritarian bias.
Professor Cass' theory of government also suppresses interesting ques-
tions about political behavior toward privatization. He somehow charac-
terizes privatization decisions as those "public interest exceptions" to the
public choice model. However, he offers no basis for the belief that these
5. See generally id. Professor Cass alludes to examples of majoritarian bias at several points
in his paper without recognizing the role of this bias in a full picture of public choice. He notes
the Director's Law where societal benefits are captured by a political majority in the middle class.
See generally Cass, supra note 2. He talks in terms of both majority and minority political power.
Id. However, when Professor Cass builds his theory of government he adopts only the special
interest focus of recent public choice theory.
6. See generally A Job for the Judges, supra note 1.
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decisions and not others would be subject to these exceptions, if such excep-
tions in fact exist. One of the paradoxes of privatization is that the same
political process, whose foibles argue for privatization, controls privatiza-
tion. Here one would expect a search for those interest groups with polit-
ical influence and an identification of the forms of privatization these
interest groups might produce. With rare exception, 7 Professor Cass' anal-
ysis of government behavior ignores these groups and their selfish interests
and instead sees privatization decisions as a breed of government behavior
dominated by public interest motives. It is especially difficult to understand
why special interest groups who produced these government schemes, ac-
cording to the economic theory of regulation, would now be absent during
their dismantling. Professor Cass' theory tells us nothing about when this is
possible, let alone likely. He is simply assuming that these outcomes are the
product of assumed lapses in the public choice model.
There is a great deal lost in such an analysis. The form of privatization
may be severely skewed and even perverse because of the pressures of the
very groups whose rule is now assumed away. Professor Cass' analysis
would not allow us to determine when and if such distortions are possible,
let alone their form.
Moreover, Professor Cass' analysis also has problems beyond his theory
of government. Whatever the attributes of the theory of government we
construct, a full analysis of privatization (normative or positive) also re-
quires a parallel analysis of alternative institutions to the government. The
analysis must be comparative. One obvious alternative is the market.
Privatization is the movement of societal decisionmaking from public to
private decisionmakers. Professor Cass recognizes the comparative aspects
by reference to the traditional market failure notions of free-rider, public
good and monopoly. However, it might be better if we could cast the issues
of market failure in the same terms in which we cast governmental failure.
Both the minoritarian or special interest bias model Professor Cass uses and
the majoritiarian bias model I suggest are defined in terms of differences in
response to concentration or dispersion of citizen interest.8
I believe that problems in the market can be cast in these same terms.
Take, for example, the issue of consumer protection which, as we have seen,
may produce special interest legislation. On the other side of the issue is
7. Only once is there a description of expected political behavior, and this is confined to the
position of labor versus other interest groups. Cass, supra note 2, at 519-20.
8. The special interest distortion occurs because concentrated (intensely impacted) minorities
are overrepresented. The majoritarian bias, operating through unweighted voting, has the oppo-
site effect.
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usually some question of consumer safety which the market allegedly fails
to handle. This potential for failure can once again be seen in terms of the
concentration and dispersion of interests. If the safety problem facing con-
sumers is complex and faces each consumer with a relatively low impact per
capita, albeit large when aggregated over all consumers, we have the condi-
tions for a failure of consumer demand for the safety step in the market.
Dispersion of interests which weakens the ability of certain groups to recog-
nize and promote their interests in the political arena causes parallel
problems in the market.
I am not arguing that this likelihood is greater (or less) than in the polit-
ical arena. My point is that analogous problems exist in both institutional
settings and they can be cast, studied, and evaluated in similar terms. Free-
rider and public good problems are a function of transaction costs which
are affected by concentration and dispersion of impacts. Costs of informa-
tion and organization are relevant in the functioning of both the market and
political arena while concentration and dispersion affect the costs and effec-
tiveness of information and organization.
Similarly, the judicial response, like the legislative, administrative and
market responses, can be analyzed in these terms. There are potential dis-
tortions in the judiciary which can be cast in terms of concentration and
dispersion. Litigating, like lobbying, requires organization and information,
and once again dispersion can be a disadvantage and concentration can be
an advantage.
Like Professor Cass, I think that the issue of privatization can best be
analyzed by an institutional approach. I believe, however, that a more so-
phisticated model of the privatization decision must be employed to address
a wider range of issues before we have an adequate analysis of privatization.
I believe we must ask questions about both legal and governmental deci-
sions from an institutional perspective. Furthermore, the degree to which
legislatures or administrative agencies will constrain or promote privatiza-
tion depends on an understanding of governmental behavior more sophisti-
cated than the familiar public interest versus special interest conception.
There is a broader range of models which allows us to address these ques-
tions without abandoning the analytically robust assumptions of self-inter-
ested behavior and aggregate interaction. If we are concerned with a
normative assessment of privatization, then we need to examine both mar-
ket and governmental responses in complete and parallel fashion. To this
end, I have proposed a conception of institutional choice broad enough to
handle the analytical challenges inherent in a complex issue such as
privatization.
1988]
